The Note That Said No — Can Karnataka Afford What It Promised?
Satyameva Jayate · Karnataka
As of 16 November 2026.
On 17 September 2026 Karnataka's own finance department advised against a ₹10,000 crore rural road scheme. The cabinet was reported to have approved it the next day. This article asks who pays for the gap.
In Brief: Karnataka's 2026-27 budget sits just inside two legal limits (deficit and debt) and outside the third (no revenue deficit). Its finance department counts ₹36,136 crore of unpaid bills in four departments, which no limit measures. Interest now costs more than the five guarantees. The auditor links the guarantees to the revenue deficit. The BJP years of 2019 to 2023 show the same habits on unbudgeted works and unpaid bills, with better deficit numbers. The Union government cut the state's tax share, then partly restored it. There are ways out, and each one names a different person to wait. Labourers, future taxpayers and villages waiting for roads carry the wait today.
Karnataka is just inside two of its three legal limits and outside the third, and the ₹36,136 crore of bills it has not paid in four departments is counted in none of them. So far the state has paid for what it promised by borrowing close to the most the law allows, by keeping contractors waiting, and by passing the interest to people who are children today. That is what the records show, and it is true of more than one government. The Congress government since May 2023 added the largest new yearly cost. The BJP government before it left approved works far beyond its budgets and a stock of unpaid bills. The Union government reduced the state's share of central taxes for five years. Three groups are missing from almost every record I read: the labourers who work for unpaid contractors, the future taxpayers who will repay the loans, and the villages still waiting for a road.
The record at a glance. Each row is argued in the Part that follows.
Question | Short answer | What it rests on |
Is the state inside its fiscal tests? | Inside two, by a narrow margin. Outside the third since 2023-24 | Budget estimate and audit |
How much does it owe? | ₹6,92,115 crore in March 2025 | Audit |
Is the debt on a safe path? | Growth is above the interest rate. The margin is narrowing | Audit |
How much is unpaid to contractors? | ₹36,136 crore in four departments. Its make-up is not published | A note known through two press reports |
Who ran up the bills? | Both governments. No audited split exists | Claims by the government and the contractors |
Did the guarantees squeeze other spending? | The auditor says yes, for the revenue account and some schemes | Audit |
How much is due to the Union? | The tax share was cut for five years and half restored | Finance Commission awards |
Is there a way out? | At least seven, and each moves the wait to someone | My reading |
Five fixed terms are used in this article, with the same meaning across the series. A guarantee is one of the five schemes Congress promised in 2023: Gruha Lakshmi, Gruha Jyothi, Anna Bhagya, Yuva Nidhi and Shakti. A promise is a commitment with a date, made in a manifesto, a cabinet order or a speech by a named office-holder. A record is a document anyone can check, such as a statute, court order, audit report, official dataset or Assembly reply. A news report points to a record. It is not one. Reach is the share of the people a promise named whom the record shows were covered, always with both numbers. Committed spending is salaries, pensions and interest: recurring costs that a government cannot easily cut within a year.
Eight more terms a reader will meet.
Term | Plain meaning |
GSDP | The value of everything produced in the state in a year |
Fiscal deficit | All spending less all income other than loans. It is what the state must borrow in the year |
Revenue deficit | Running costs less running income. It is borrowing to run, not to build |
Primary deficit | The fiscal deficit less interest. It shows the year's own gap |
Capital spending | Spending that leaves an asset, such as a road or a canal |
Budget estimate, revised estimate, actual | The plan, the mid-year correction and the audited result for one year |
Off-budget borrowing | A loan taken by a state body which the state itself repays |
Loan guarantee | The state's promise to repay a company's loan if the company cannot |
Opening — One day between the warning and the yes
On 17 September 2026 Karnataka's finance department wrote a note on a file numbered FD 317 EXP6/2026¹. The file carried a proposal from the rural development department. It asked for a new scheme, the Chief Minister's Rural Road Connectivity Scheme, to build 15,000 km of village roads for ₹10,000 crore over 2026-27 and 2027-28² ³.
The note advised against it for now. According to the two reports that quote it, the department wrote that pending bills in four departments stood at ₹36,136 crore¹ ². It wrote that the balance cost of works already under way was more than ₹2 lakh crore. It wrote that the state had "virtually exhausted" its borrowing capacity for the year¹. One sentence is quoted in full: "It would be prudent to be realistic regarding the funding envelope that is available."²
I have not seen the note itself. It is not on any government website that I could find. I rely on The Week (22 September 2026) and a Press Trust of India report of the same day. Both quote it and one gives its file number. So what I have is a credible report of a record, not the record. The "no" in the title is my word for its advice. A finance department advises and a cabinet decides, and the sentence quoted above is a caution in an official's language.
The next day, Friday 18 September 2026, the cabinet met in Mangaluru. The Deccan Chronicle and one other outlet reported that it approved the road scheme as part of a package of about ₹32,611 crore³ ⁴. Neither report names where the money will come from. Neither says whether the approval was a decision in principle, an administrative sanction or a release of money. Those are three different things, and only the last one spends a rupee.
Two men have held the office in this story. D.K. Shivakumar has been Chief Minister since 3 June 2026 and also holds the finance portfolio. Siddaramaiah was Chief Minister and finance minister from May 2023 until then, and presented the 2026-27 budget on 6 March 2026. The BJP governed the state from July 2019 to May 2023 under B.S. Yediyurappa and then Basavaraj Bommai. The National Democratic Alliance has governed the Union throughout.
My reading of the picture. The governing image of this article is a pot filled to the brim. The law draws a line near the top. The state has filled the pot to within a finger's width of that line. Anything now added must spill on someone. The rest of this article asks who that someone is.
Part One — Five reasons to wait, and a cabinet that did not
The note said that Karnataka did not have the money in sight for a ₹10,000 crore scheme, and the government went ahead with new road commitments after it.
The note gave five reasons, by the reports¹ ². First, the fiscal deficit for 2026-27 was already budgeted at 2.95% of the state's output (GSDP), against a legal limit of 3%. Second, the revenue deficit was ₹22,957 crore. Third, total liabilities were projected at 24.94% of GSDP, against a limit of 25%. Fourth, pending bills in Public Works, Water Resources, Minor Irrigation, and Rural Development and Panchayat Raj came to ₹36,136 crore. Fifth, works already begun needed more than ₹2 lakh crore to finish, and projects worth more than ₹5,000 crore had been added in the first six months of the year without money identified beyond that year.
The note counts the guarantees as a cost and does not name them as a cause. The PTI report says the note recorded the five guarantees at ₹51,286 crore for the year². In the reports I read, the note does not say the guarantees caused the squeeze. It lists them among the claims on a fixed sum.
It carried two more warnings. A drought could add ₹4,000 crore to ₹5,000 crore to the power subsidy for irrigation pump sets. It said transport corporations, irrigation corporations and electricity companies had cash-flow problems, and that subsidy payments had seen defaults and delays¹ ². It said that funding even part of the road scheme could mean cuts elsewhere, "potentially delaying or halting ongoing works", in the report's paraphrase².
The Chief Minister made light of it. On 22 September 2026 Shivakumar called it "a normal caution from the department"¹. He also said, "being the finance minister, I know what programmes must be cut and what is needed", and that the government would stay within the legal deficit limits². That is a fair point in his defence. A finance department is meant to say no, and a cabinet is allowed to overrule it.
The opposition took the other line. On 23 September 2026 BJP leaders protested at the Vidhana Soudha²⁹. The state president, B.Y. Vijayendra, asked for a white paper on the state's finances. The Leader of the Opposition, R. Ashoka, asked for the Chief Minister's resignation⁴⁷. Their figures were the note's own. The reports I read record no proposal from the BJP on what it would cut, tax or change. So the question I put to the government applies to the opposition as well: if not this, then what? A white paper is close to the first fix in Part Seven, and I count that in its favour.
Four things have happened since, and I know all four from reports. On 30 September 2026 the Karnataka State Contractors' Association said eight departments owed its members about ₹38,000 crore and set November as its deadline¹⁵. On the same day ThePrint reported, from a senior official it did not name, a plan to find ₹50,000 crore over two years for development works: about ₹20,000 crore through the budget, and the rest from tolls on existing roads, public-private partnerships and disinvestment. The report says the plan had not yet gone to the cabinet⁴². On 3 October one outlet reported, from officials it did not name, that ₹2,400 crore had been released to the irrigation department for pending bills, that the finance department's clearance was still to be issued, and that departments could draw early on the next quarter's allocation because there was no new budget provision⁴³. The association called the sum less than a tenth of its claim. The report does not say the money reached contractors.
On 5 November 2026 the rural development minister, Eshwar Khandre, announced that the cabinet had decided "to allocate Rs 20,000 crore for the Public Works Department" for highways, roads and bridges²⁷. The PTI report of his briefing lists items that add up to about ₹18,400 crore, and calls only one of them, a revised estimate for roads around Bengaluru, an administrative approval. It reports the minister as saying that the allocations had the finance department's approval, that the announcements would be carried out over the next two financial years, and that one part would be paid for by a loan from the Asian Development Bank⁴⁴. So the November decision, as reported, has the finance department's consent and a span of two years. That is in the government's favour and I record it. A cabinet approval is still not an appropriation. The money is spent only when the legislature votes it and the treasury releases it. I have not seen either cabinet order. I could not confirm whether the finance department's observations of September were placed before the cabinet, as the Chief Minister was reported to have ordered².
On 2 November 2026 a delegation of the contractors' association met the Chief Minister. Reports of the meeting say he set up a three-member team under his economic adviser, L.K. Atheeq, and they give no date for payment³¹ ³².
Figure 1 · Seven weeks after the note: two cabinet decisions on new works, one reported release and no payment schedule

What to see: the dated events from 17 September to 5 November 2026. Decisions on new works are above the line. Events about unpaid bills are below it.
Source: the reports cited in this Part.
How these four sums for new works fit together I cannot say, and no report does. The table sets out what each report states.
Date reported | What | Sum | What the report says of its status |
18 September 2026 | Rural road scheme, 15,000 km | ₹10,000 crore | Approved by the cabinet as part of the package below, a day after the finance department advised against it |
18 September 2026 | Package approved at Mangaluru | About ₹32,611 crore | Cabinet approval. Source of money not stated |
30 September 2026 | Plan for development works over two years | ₹50,000 crore | Not yet before the cabinet. About ₹20,000 crore to come from the budget |
5 November 2026 | Public Works roads and bridges | ₹20,000 crore | Cabinet decision. Finance department approval reported. Over two financial years |
Sources: reports of the four dates³ ⁴ ⁴² ⁴⁴.
Whether the November sum is part of the ₹50,000 crore plan, or the September package is, is stated in nothing I read. If none of them overlap, the three larger sums come to about ₹1.03 lakh crore. The whole capital outlay in the 2026-27 budget is ₹71,924 crore⁵. The addition is mine, and it is the first question I would put to the finance department.
Figure 2 · Three sums for new works were reported in seven weeks, beside a capital budget of ₹71,924 crore for the whole year

What to see: the September package, the two-year plan and the November decision as three bars, with a line at the capital outlay budgeted for 2026-27. The three may overlap in what they cover. No report says.
Source: reports of 18 September, 30 September and 5 November 2026, and PRS Legislative Research, Karnataka Budget Analysis 2026-27.
The ₹36,136 crore is not the whole of the unpaid bills. It covers four departments only. The contractors count eight. I found no single official statement of all pending bills across the government.
None of this was costed before the vote. The Congress manifesto of 2023 sets out the five guarantees on pages 6 and 25⁴⁰. I found no cost beside them and no statement of how they would be paid for. The BJP manifesto prints sums for some of its own schemes, among them a ₹30,000 crore K-Agri Fund on page 12, and I found no period and no source of money beside that figure⁴¹. So the first costing of the guarantees that a voter could read came after the election, in the budget of July 2023. Part Seven comes back to this.
Part Two — Two limits met by a hair, and a third not met at all
It is inside two of three, by very little, and outside the third. First I set out the government's defence in its best form.
The government's best defence
It runs like this. The law sets the test, and Karnataka passes it. The fiscal deficit has stayed at or under 3% of GSDP in every year since 2022-23. Total debt is below 25% of GSDP, well under the average for all states, which the auditor put at 27.63% in 2024-25⁶. The state raises three of every four rupees of its revenue itself⁵. Its squeeze was made worse elsewhere. The 15th Finance Commission cut Karnataka's share of central taxes from 4.713% to 3.647%, and the Union government did not release special grants the commission had recommended. A large part of the contractors' dues comes from works the BJP government approved without budget. And the guarantees put about ₹50,000 crore a year into households, more than half of it as a monthly payment to women who head them, which is a choice an elected government may make.
Every sentence in that paragraph is supported by a record or a credible report, and I concede each one. The question is what the paragraph leaves out.
Set beside other states, Karnataka is in the middle on debt and above the average on fixed costs. PRS Legislative Research compared the states' budgets in October 2025⁴⁵. On its figures Karnataka's liabilities were 26% of GSDP, against 17% for Gujarat, 18% for Maharashtra, 30% for Tamil Nadu, 36% for Kerala and 46% for Punjab. Salaries, pensions and interest took 58% of Karnataka's revenue receipts in the 2025-26 budget, against 50% for all states together. Karnataka budgeted ₹28,608 crore that year for an unconditional cash transfer to women, which PRS puts at 9.2% of its revenue spending. Maharashtra budgeted ₹36,000 crore, or 5.9%, and Tamil Nadu ₹13,807 crore, or 3.7%. Twelve states together budgeted ₹1,68,040 crore for such transfers. PRS counts liabilities on a different basis from the auditor, so its 26% is not the auditor's 23.73%, and I use its figures only to set one state beside another. Two readings follow, and both are mine. Karnataka is not an outlier on debt. And it is not alone in its choice, which states governed by different parties have also made, though it gives the transfer a larger share of its spending than the other two I compare.
Figure 3 · Karnataka's liabilities are below the all-state level, and well below Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Punjab

What to see: liabilities as a share of GSDP for eight states, on PRS's count, with a line at the all-state level of 27.5%. Karnataka and Telangana are at 26%.
Source: PRS Legislative Research, State of State Finances, October 2025. The basis differs from the auditor's, so the Karnataka bar is not the 23.73% used elsewhere in this article.
Three tests in the law
The Karnataka Fiscal Responsibility Act sets three tests, as the audit and the finance department describe them¹ ⁶. The fiscal deficit must not exceed 3% of GSDP. Total liabilities must not exceed 25% of GSDP. And the revenue account must not be in deficit, which means the state should not borrow to pay for daily running costs. The first two are ceilings. The third is a balance the state is required to keep. The auditor calls all three targets or norms⁶. A budget figure is a plan and an audited figure is a result, and I say which is which each time.
The state meets the first test. The 2026-27 budget puts the fiscal deficit at ₹97,448 crore, or 2.95% of GSDP⁵. In 2024-25, the last audited year, it was 2.95% as well⁶.
It meets the second narrowly. The budget projects liabilities of ₹8,24,389 crore at the end of March 2027, which is 24.94% of GSDP²⁵.
It fails the third. The state has run a revenue deficit in every year since 2023-24. It was ₹9,272 crore in 2023-24 and ₹20,834 crore in 2024-25, both from the audited accounts⁶. After its own corrections the auditor puts the 2024-25 figure higher, at ₹22,843 crore, or 0.79% of GSDP⁶. It is ₹25,449 crore in the revised estimate for 2025-26, which is 32% above what was budgeted, and ₹22,957 crore in the 2026-27 budget⁵. The government's own medium-term plan expects a revenue surplus only by 2029-30¹².
Missing a test costs a state less than a reader might expect. The tests sit in the state's own Act, and I found no report of a penalty for missing the revenue target in any of the three years. The firmer check comes from the Union. Under Article 293 of the Constitution a state that owes money to the Union needs its consent to borrow, and the Union may attach conditions⁵⁰. In practice it sets a borrowing limit for the states each year, which PRS gives as 3% of GSDP for 2025-26⁴⁵. So a state cannot simply borrow past the deficit line. It can miss the revenue target year after year, and it can pay its bills late, and that limit stops neither. I have not read the state's Act itself.
Under the two limits it meets, very little room is left. This is my arithmetic from the budget figures. Three per cent of the budgeted GSDP of ₹33,05,500 crore is ₹99,165 crore. The budgeted deficit is ₹97,448 crore. The room is about ₹1,700 crore. On debt, 25% of GSDP is ₹8,26,375 crore, and the room is about ₹2,000 crore. A ₹10,000 crore scheme spread over two years does not fit in that room unless something else is cut, taxes rise, or the bills are paid late. If GSDP turns out lower than budgeted, the room shrinks further. This room is a margin on paper under the budget's own ratios. It is not cash in hand. The Union government also sets a yearly borrowing ceiling for each state, and I have not checked where Karnataka stands against it for 2026-27. The note, as reported, says the borrowing capacity for the year is "virtually exhausted"¹.
Test in the state's fiscal law | Limit or target | 2026-27 budget estimate | Margin under the ratio (my arithmetic) |
Fiscal deficit | 3% of GSDP | 2.95%, or ₹97,448 crore | About ₹1,700 crore |
Total liabilities | 25% of GSDP | 24.94%, or ₹8,24,389 crore | About ₹2,000 crore |
Revenue account | No deficit | Deficit of ₹22,957 crore | None. The test is not met |
Unpaid bills, four departments | Counted by no test | ₹36,136 crore | Not applicable |
Sources: PRS Legislative Research⁵, budget speech as reported²⁵, finance department note as reported¹ ².
Do unpaid bills count towards any limit? No, and this is the centre of this article. The state keeps its accounts on a cash basis. A bill counts as spending when it is paid, not when the work is done. So ₹36,136 crore of pending bills appears in neither the deficit nor the debt. My arithmetic again: that sum is about 1.1% of the budgeted GSDP. If the four departments' bills were paid this year by borrowing, the deficit would be about 4% and the debt about 26%, both over the limit. This is an inference, not a finding of the auditor.
What that ₹36,136 crore is made of I do not know, and the reports do not say. A pending bill may be checked and accepted, still under check, or disputed. It may be for a new road, which is capital spending, or for repairs, which is revenue spending. The note, as reported, gives one total for four departments. So the 4% and 26% above are a test of scale. They do not mean that the whole sum falls due in one year or that all of it would be borrowed. Part Seven sets out what paying it over three or five years would take.
The audited accounts show these bills only in part. The auditor counts some things beyond the plain debt. Off-budget borrowings of ₹14,155 crore are included in the total liabilities. Loan guarantees, which the state gives for the borrowing of its own companies and which are a different thing from the five guarantee schemes, stood at ₹45,889 crore at the end of March 2025, mostly for power companies. That is well inside the law's ceiling of ₹1,83,264 crore, and it becomes the state's debt only if a company fails to pay. On dues not paid, the report gives three figures, each for a narrow category. It found 276 works shown as incomplete for want of payment of bills of ₹2,298 crore. It found ₹640.44 crore of construction workers' cess not passed on to their welfare board. And it names undischarged liabilities of ₹64.08 crore, which are unpaid interest on disaster funds and a shortfall in pension contributions⁶. Together these come to about ₹3,000 crore. I found no audited figure that can be reconciled with the finance department's ₹36,136 crore for four departments. The dates differ as well: the audit is of March 2025 and the note of September 2026. My reading is that the accounts are not wrong by their own rules. The rules do not ask for a count of every bill received and not yet paid.
Figure 4 · The audit names about ₹3,000 crore of dues not paid, and the finance department's note names ₹36,136 crore

What to see: three figures from the audit of 2024-25, each for a narrow category, beside the finance department's figure for pending bills in four departments. They are for different dates and are not the same count. No audited figure reconciles them.
Source: CAG State Finances report 2024-25, and the finance department note of 17 September 2026 as reported.
Figure 5 · The 2026-27 budget sits just under two limits, and the unpaid bills sit outside both

What to see: the budgeted deficit of 2.95% against the limit of 3%, and budgeted liabilities of 24.94% against the limit of 25%. The hatched part shows where each would stand if the ₹36,136 crore of pending bills were paid by borrowing this year: about 4% and about 26%. The hatched part is my arithmetic.
Source: PRS Legislative Research, Karnataka Budget Analysis 2026-27, and the finance department note of 17 September 2026 as reported by The Week and PTI.
Borrowing to run the house
An economist would call a revenue deficit borrowing to run the house. Public finance has an old rule of thumb, often called the golden rule. A government may borrow to build things that last, because the people who use the road later help to repay the loan. It should meet its running costs from its running income. Karnataka's own law writes that rule as its third test. A revenue deficit of ₹22,957 crore means that about a quarter of the ₹97,448 crore borrowed this year pays for salaries, subsidies and interest. That is not a judgement on their worth. A teacher's salary or a monthly transfer to a poor household may do more good than a badly placed road. The accounting line says one thing only: at the end of the year no asset stands against the loan. The division is mine.
An accountant would say of the bills that the state keeps a cash book and not a balance sheet. A business must show what it owes its suppliers as a liability on the day the goods arrive. A government on cash accounting shows nothing until it pays. So a department can stay inside a deficit limit by not paying. The unpaid bill is in effect a loan taken from the contractor, without his consent and without interest. Students of accounting know the two systems as cash and accrual.
The BJP years, by the same three tests
On the same source, the record is mixed, and better in its last year. The auditor's five-year table shows the fiscal deficit at 4.19% of GSDP in 2020-21, 3.32% in 2021-22 and 2.02% in 2022-23⁶. The first two were above 3%. They were inside the limits the law then allowed, which were relaxed to 5% and 4% in the pandemic years⁶. The revenue account was in deficit by ₹19,338 crore in 2020-21 and ₹13,666 crore in 2021-22, and in surplus by ₹13,496 crore in 2022-23⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹. So the BJP government also broke the revenue rule in two of its years, with the pandemic as its reason, and met all three rules in its last full year.
By the deficit rule alone, then, 2022-23 was the best year in the series and it belonged to the BJP. Part Four shows why that number, too, left unpaid bills out.
Figure 6 · The revenue account was in surplus in one year of the last seven

What to see: the revenue balance for each year from 2020-21 to 2026-27. Only 2022-23 is above zero, at ₹13,496 crore. The deepest deficit is the revised estimate for 2025-26, at ₹25,449 crore. The first three years fall in the BJP government's term and the last four in the Congress government's.
Source: PRS Legislative Research budget analyses for 2022-23 to 2026-27, and CAG State Finances report 2024-25. The figures for 2025-26 and 2026-27 are revised and budget estimates.
Part Three — ₹6.92 lakh crore owed, and 59 paise of every rupee already spoken for
The state owed ₹6,92,115 crore at the end of March 2025, and by the budget's own count about 59 paise of every rupee of revenue in 2026-27 is committed before any new work begins.
One source covers both governments. The auditor's table gives total outstanding liabilities at the end of each year⁶. They were ₹4,15,926 crore in March 2021, ₹4,90,256 crore in March 2022 and ₹5,53,363 crore in March 2023. Those are the BJP years in the table. They were ₹6,33,531 crore in March 2024 and ₹6,92,115 crore in March 2025. Those are the first two Congress years.
In rupees the two governments added almost the same. From March 2021 to March 2023 the liabilities rose by ₹1,37,437 crore. From March 2023 to March 2025 they rose by ₹1,38,752 crore. The subtraction is mine. As a share of GSDP the two periods differ. The ratio fell from 24.59% to 22.54% in the first, because the economy grew faster than the debt. It rose to 23.73% in the second⁶. The budget projects ₹8,24,389 crore, or 24.94%, by March 2027²⁵. The budget figure and the audit figure may not be counted in exactly the same way, so I treat the last step as a direction and not as a precise comparison.
Figure 7 · The state's liabilities rose by about ₹1.38 lakh crore in each two-year period, under both governments

What to see: total liabilities at the end of March each year from 2021 to 2025, with the budget's projection for March 2027. The rise from March 2021 to March 2023 is ₹1,37,437 crore. The rise from March 2023 to March 2025 is ₹1,38,752 crore.
Source: CAG State Finances report 2024-25 for 2021 to 2025. Budget speech of 6 March 2026 as reported for 2027.
The first BJP year, 2019-20, falls outside this comparison, because the audit table starts in 2020-21. PRS, working from budget papers, gave liabilities of 19.87% of GSDP for 2019-20¹¹. That figure is on a different basis from the auditor's, so I do not join the two. Read together, the two figures point to a rise in the pandemic year 2020-21, under the BJP, when the deficit reached 4.19% of GSDP. I cannot give the size of that rise on one basis.
The auditor's own conclusion is that the debt is inside the limit and not yet safe. The 2024-25 report says the debt ratio stayed within 25% but that it was "too early to opine that debt burden of the State has reached a sustainable level"⁶. It also records that the debt stock of 23.73% was above the government's own plan target of 23.24% for that year.
To judge whether a debt is on a safe path, economists ask one question first: is the economy growing faster than the rate of interest on the debt? If it is, a state can run a steady deficit and the debt ratio need not rise. The test is named after the economist Evsey Domar, and the auditor applies it. In 2024-25 the state paid an effective interest rate of 6.93% on its debt, and its GSDP grew by 12.77% in money terms. The gap was in the state's favour, as it was in every year of the auditor's table except the pandemic year 2020-21. The auditor calls this favourable and notes that the gap is narrowing. It also records that the primary deficit, which is the deficit before interest is counted, was ₹47,477 crore, or 1.65% of GSDP, and that this balance has worsened year after year⁶. So growth is still carrying the debt, and by a smaller margin each year. Both halves of that sentence are the auditor's.
Figure 8 · The economy grew faster than the interest rate in every year but one, and the gap has halved since 2021-22

What to see: the growth of GSDP in money terms as bars and the effective interest rate on the state's debt as a line, for 2020-21 to 2024-25. The gap was 10.24 points in 2021-22 and 4.83 points in 2024-25.
Source: CAG State Finances report 2024-25.
Most of what the state borrows goes to service what it borrowed before. The auditor's table shows that after repaying principal and interest, 46.69% of the money borrowed was left for other use in 2020-21, 37.23% in 2022-23 and 35.41% in 2024-25⁶. In between it was 41.80% in 2021-22 and 42.24% in 2023-24. The lowest year is the latest. In 2026-27 the state plans to borrow ₹1,32,000 crore and repay ₹35,316 crore of principal⁵. In 2022-23 it borrowed ₹44,549 crore⁹.
Figure 9 · About a third of what the state borrows is left after it services old debt

What to see: the share of each year's borrowing left for other use after repayments, from 46.69% in 2020-21 to 35.41% in 2024-25.
Source: CAG State Finances report 2024-25. The share left is 100 less the auditor's ratio of repayment to gross borrowing.
Then there is the spending that is fixed before any choice is made. PRS uses one definition across years, so I use PRS here. Salaries, pensions and interest took 45% of revenue receipts in 2022-23 (actual), 51% in 2024-25 (actual) and 59% in the 2026-27 budget, when they total ₹1,85,025 crore⁵ ⁹. The auditor uses a narrower count of salaries and gets about 45% for 2024-25. It adds that with subsidies of ₹81,880 crore the "inflexible" part of spending was about 77% of revenue receipts that year⁶.
No single thing is driving it up. Between the 2024-25 actuals and the 2026-27 budget, salaries rise from ₹64,652 crore to ₹90,557 crore, pensions from ₹30,651 crore to ₹41,136 crore, and interest from ₹36,122 crore to ₹53,332 crore⁵. The largest rise in rupees is in salaries, which has nothing to do with the guarantees. It follows another decision of the same government. On 15 July 2024 the cabinet accepted the Seventh State Pay Commission's award from 1 August 2024, a rise of 27.5% on basic pay for more than seven lakh employees. One report of that decision gives its yearly cost as ₹17,440 crore in one place and ₹20,208 crore in another⁴⁶. On either figure it is a new recurring cost between a third and two fifths the size of the guarantees, taken on a year after them.
Interest now costs more than the guarantees, by the budget's own figures. Interest is budgeted at ₹53,332 crore in 2026-27. The five guarantees are budgeted at ₹51,286 crore⁵. In 2022-23 the state paid ₹29,643 crore in interest⁶. The first figure is a budget estimate and the second an audited actual, so the comparison is approximate. The direction is not in doubt. The two are different kinds of spending. Interest is the price of past borrowing by every government. The guarantees are this government's choice. The comparison shows scale. It does not show that one caused the other.
The interest burden is not new. It has grown for ten years under governments of every party. The auditor's table shows interest taking 9.59% of revenue receipts in 2015-16, 11.34% in 2019-20, a peak of 14.95% in the pandemic year 2020-21, 12.94% in 2022-23 and 14.53% in 2024-25⁶. Another passage of the same report gives 14.72% for the last year. The fall after 2020-21 came in the BJP years and the rise since then in the Congress years.
Figure 10 · Interest took under 10 paise of each rupee of revenue in 2015-16 and over 14 paise in 2024-25

What to see: interest payments as a share of revenue receipts for ten years. The peak is the pandemic year 2020-21. The share fell for two years and has risen for two.
Source: CAG State Finances report 2024-25.
Who will repay? People who are not yet taxpayers. Loans taken this decade are repaid over many years. The medium-term plan projects interest rising to 1.85% of GSDP by 2029-30, from 1.26% in 2024-25, and the Fifth State Finance Commission is reported to expect total liabilities above ₹11.20 lakh crore within four years¹². Divided by the 6.11 crore people counted in the 2011 census, the liabilities of March 2025 come to about ₹1.13 lakh a person. The population has grown since, so the true figure is somewhat lower. The same audit puts income per person at ₹3,80,906 for 2024-25⁶. The division is mine. Many of today's schoolchildren will be working adults while these loans are still being serviced. No budget document I read states what that will cost each future household. The children are the first group this debate leaves out, because they cannot be asked.
The lender is mostly the market, and the money falls due sooner than "the next generation" suggests. Of the liabilities at the end of March 2025, ₹4,89,398 crore was internal debt, which is borrowing within India, and ₹37,081 crore was owed to the Union government. The rest is money the state holds for others, such as provident funds and deposits⁶. In 2024-25 alone the state raised ₹71,525 crore from the market, net of repayments. And 46.09% of the public debt, about ₹2,42,616 crore, falls due within seven years⁶. So a good part of the repayment arrives in the term of the next government and the one after it.
Figure 11 · Forty-six per cent of the state's public debt falls due within seven years

What to see: the public debt of ₹5,26,479 crore at the end of March 2025, split by when it must be repaid. The four bars on the left add up to 46.09%.
Source: CAG State Finances report 2024-25.
Whether that is fair to them is an old question. In 1789 Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison "that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living", and concluded that "no generation can contract debts greater than may be paid during the course of it's own existence"³⁵. Usufruct is the right to use a thing without using it up. The Tirukkuṟaḷ, the classical Tamil book of couplets, gives the householder's version³⁴:
"A small income is no cause for failure, provided expenditures do not exceed it." Tirukkuṟaḷ 478
Neither text settles the matter. A loan that builds a canal hands the next generation the canal with the debt. A loan that pays this year's salaries hands it only the debt, unless the salary or the transfer left a child better fed and better taught. That is a claim about outcomes, and it needs a study to prove it. That is why the kind of deficit matters more than its size. The reading is mine.
Figure 12 · Interest is budgeted to cost more than the five guarantees in 2026-27

What to see: salaries, pensions and interest in 2024-25 and in the 2026-27 budget, with the five guarantees beside them. Interest rises from ₹36,122 crore to ₹53,332 crore. The guarantees are budgeted at ₹51,286 crore. Salaries show the largest rise in rupees.
Source: PRS Legislative Research, Karnataka Budget Analysis 2026-27.
Part Four — ₹36,136 crore in unpaid bills, and two governments pointing at each other
Contractors in at least four departments are owed ₹36,136 crore by the finance department's count, both governments added to the pile, and nobody has published a list that would settle the shares.
There are three kinds of figure. The finance department's note gives ₹36,136 crore for four departments in September 2026¹ ². The contractors' association gives about ₹38,000 crore for eight departments, including ₹14,000 crore in major irrigation, ₹8,000 crore in Public Works and ₹3,600 crore in minor irrigation¹⁵ ¹⁶. The auditor gives a much smaller figure on a narrower question: 276 works left incomplete because of pending bills of ₹2,298 crore, among 4,328 incomplete projects on which ₹5,066 crore had been spent, as of 2024-25⁶. The first two figures are of the same order. They are not the same count. One covers four departments and the other eight, and neither report says how a pending bill is defined.
Date | Who gave the figure | What it covers | Amount |
11 August 2023 | Contractors' association | Its members' dues | Over ₹20,000 crore |
14 October 2023 | Contractors' association | Its members' dues | About ₹22,000 crore |
Year 2024-25 | Comptroller and Auditor General | 276 works left incomplete for unpaid bills | ₹2,298 crore |
30 January 2026 | State government | Dues as stated in public | ₹38,000 crore, with ₹20,000 crore said to be from the BJP years |
17 September 2026 | Finance department note, as reported | Four departments | ₹36,136 crore |
30 September 2026 | Contractors' association | Eight departments | About ₹38,000 crore |
Sources: reports cited in this Part¹ ² ⁶ ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁹ ²⁰.
Figure 13 · Five dated figures for unpaid bills run from about ₹20,000 crore to about ₹38,000 crore, and no two count the same thing

What to see: each dated figure from August 2023 to September 2026, marked by who gave it. The two figures of 2023 come from the contractors. The figure of ₹36,136 crore comes from the finance department and covers four departments only. The bars are not one series. They show the size of the claim at each date.
Source: contractors' association statements of 11 August 2023, 14 October 2023 and 30 September 2026, the government's statement of 30 January 2026, and the finance department note of 17 September 2026, all as reported.
The present government puts a large share of this on its predecessor. On 30 January 2026 the then Chief Minister, Siddaramaiah, said, "The pending bills were left behind by the BJP. It is true that there are pending bills"¹³ ¹⁴. A figure was given the same day: ₹20,000 crore of ₹38,000 crore from the BJP government and the rest from the present one. One report attributes that split to the Chief Minister and another to the minister Ramalinga Reddy¹³ ¹⁴. Either way it is a claim by the government in office. I found no audited split.
The claim is partly borne out by the contractors' own earlier numbers. On 11 August 2023, three months after the BJP left office, the association's then president said the backlog was "over Rs 20,000 crore"¹⁹. On 14 October 2023 he put it at "around ₹22,000 crore"²⁰. So a pile of roughly that size existed when or soon after the government changed. This supports the claim that a large stock was inherited.
Then is the present government in the clear? No. Two points follow from the same numbers. First, the association's own figure rose from about ₹22,000 crore in October 2023 to about ₹38,000 crore in September 2026, all under this government. I cannot say how much of that rise is new unpaid work. Nobody has published an opening balance, the bills added, the bills paid and a closing balance on one basis. Second, I cannot tell which bills are still unpaid. If old bills were paid first, as Bengaluru's civic body told the High Court it did by "seniority" in 2023²⁸, then much of today's ₹38,000 crore is for work done after May 2023. If old bills were held back, the inherited share is real but three and a half years old. Either reading leaves the present government responsible for the wait. This is my inference from claims, and it is weaker than an audit would be.
The BJP government is also charged with approving works it had not budgeted for. The successor government said so in its first budget, and finance department sources gave numbers. In July 2023 Siddaramaiah told the Assembly that the water resources department had "approved works five times its allocation", that nearly ₹1 lakh crore was needed for approved irrigation projects, and that 1,247 works worth ₹25,548 crore were taken up in the previous government's last six months²². In August 2023 the Deccan Herald, citing finance department sources, put works in three departments at ₹1.40 lakh crore, including ₹28,253 crore approved but not started, "mostly tendered in the six months before" the election²¹. The budget speech is a statement by an interested party. The audit gives one check on the habit that applies to both governments: money released by executive order before the legislature approved it. That was ₹5,282 crore in 2020-21, ₹8,489 crore in 2021-22 and ₹10,949 crore in 2022-23 under the BJP. It was ₹4,851 crore in 2023-24 and ₹10,035 crore in 2024-25 under Congress⁶. The auditor calls the practice contrary to Article 266(3) of the Constitution. The highest year and the second highest belong to different governments.
Figure 14 · Both governments released thousands of crores before the legislature approved it

What to see: money released by executive order ahead of the legislature's approval in each year from 2020-21 to 2024-25. The highest year, 2022-23, is under the BJP government. The second highest, 2024-25, is under the Congress government.
Source: CAG State Finances report 2024-25.
The pile of unfinished work has grown too, by the reports, though the two counts are not like for like. The 2023 figure of ₹1.40 lakh crore covered three departments. The 2026 note's figure of more than ₹2 lakh crore covers all departments¹ ²¹. I can say only that the present government has not reduced the stock it complained of.
The good deficit of 2022-23 looks somewhat different in this light. If about ₹20,000 crore of bills were unpaid when that year closed, the 2.02% deficit left them out, just as 2.95% leaves out ₹36,136 crore now. Rough arithmetic of my own, using the auditor's debt ratio to work back to GSDP, puts ₹20,000 crore at about 0.8% of that year's GSDP. The contractors' figure dates from some months after the year ended, so this is an indication and no more. The same rule applied to both governments gives the same result: each one's deficit figure was flattered by bills it had not paid.
The contractors make a second charge. The association alleges that a commission is demanded to clear bills and that it is higher now than under the BJP government. Its president declined to give a percentage¹⁵. The same association made the "40 per cent" allegation against the BJP government before the 2023 election. Shivakumar has asked the association to file an affidavit with names and said he would have it investigated¹⁵. These are allegations. I found no charge-sheet or court finding on them for either period, and I make no claim that any person took money.
The government has made the contractors one promise. By the association's letter of 29 September 2026, the Chief Minister assured them on 30 June 2026 that the bills would be cleared within two months¹⁷. That date passed. In February 2026 Shivakumar, then Deputy Chief Minister, had said, "The government is making payments as per the allocated budget provisions"¹⁸.
On 2 November 2026 a delegation met him again and asked for the release of nearly ₹38,000 crore, which the association says has been pending since 2021-22³¹. That starting year lies in the BJP government's term. As of 16 November 2026 I found no report of a payment schedule. The one release I found reported is the ₹2,400 crore for irrigation bills described in Part One⁴³.
The labourer behind the unpaid contractor
Labourers do, and they are almost absent from the record. The association says it speaks for 1.5 lakh contractors¹⁵. I could not find any official count of the workers those contractors employ, or of wages owed to them. Not one of the reports I read on the dues mentions a labourer. The people who do the physical work on a road or a canal are hired by the contractor, not by the state. They have no contract with the government and so no bill of their own to present. I found no record of how many are women, migrants, Dalits or Adivasis.
Three pieces of record touch them. In November 2023 a High Court bench told the state, "Don't drive the contractors to the corner", and noted from the government's own records that two contractors had died by suicide²⁸. In April 2025 a district contractors' body claimed ten such deaths, which I could not verify³⁰. And the 2024-25 audit found that ₹640.44 crore collected as the building and construction workers' welfare cess was still to be transferred to the workers' welfare board at the end of March 2025⁶. That last figure is the only audited number I found about construction labourers in the state's finances, and it shows money meant for them held back. It does not measure harm to the labourers on the unpaid works. That harm is a risk the record makes likely. It is not an outcome the record shows.
What a late-paying buyer does to a small firm
A contractor pays for cement, steel, diesel and wages before he is paid. He covers the gap with working capital, usually a bank loan. Every month of delay adds interest that no bill recovers. A student of business will see three results. The small contractor fails first, because he has the least credit. Those who survive price the delay into their next bid, so the state pays more for the same road. And the bidder who cannot wait leaves the market to those who can. I state these as the ordinary logic of credit. I found no study that measures them for Karnataka's public works.
The law already knows this problem when the buyer is a company. Under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act of 2006 a buyer must pay a small supplier within 45 days at the most. If he does not, he owes compound interest, with monthly rests, at three times the Reserve Bank's bank rate, whatever the contract says³³. Since November 2018 every central public sector enterprise must also register on TReDS, a platform where a supplier can sell an accepted invoice to a financier and be paid at once³⁶. I have not checked how far these two rules reach a state department's works contractors. Where they do not, that is the gap to close.
The queue for the state's money
Set the state's creditors in a row. The lender who holds a state bond is paid on the due date, because one missed payment would raise the cost of every later loan. The employee and the pensioner are paid each month. The household on a guarantee's list is paid, sometimes months late, as the article on the guarantees shows. The contractor waits for years. His labourer, who has no direct claim on the state for the contractor's bill, comes last. No law that I read sets this order. It follows from who can hurt a government that does not pay: the lenders at once, the staff through a strike, the voter at the next election, the contractor through a protest, and the labourer hardly at all. A student of sociology would say that the queue follows power. This is my reading. The record behind it is the set of dates in this article, not a study. I found no report of a missed interest payment or a missed salary in these years, and I have not checked the treasury's own record of either.
Figure 15 · The order in which the state pays, as the dates in this article show it

What to see: five groups the state owes, from the one paid soonest to the one paid last, with what the record says of each. The order is my reading. It is not a finding of the auditor.
Source: the reports and the audit cited in this Part, and the article on the guarantees for the households.
Part Five — Did the guarantees stop the roads? What the auditor says, and what it does not
Capital spending fell in the guarantees' first year and was cut below budget in 2025-26, and the auditor, not this author, links the guarantees to the revenue deficit and to a squeeze on other schemes.
The guarantees have cost about ₹1.9 lakh crore over four years, on mixed figures. The auditor records ₹34,859 crore spent in 2023-24 and ₹52,526 crore in 2024-25⁶. PRS gives ₹51,034 crore for 2025-26 and ₹51,286 crore budgeted for 2026-27, which is 12% of spending excluding debt repayment⁵. The sum is mine and mixes audited, revised and budgeted numbers.
More than half of the guarantee money goes to one scheme. For 2024-25 the audit records ₹29,608 crore for Gruha Lakshmi, the monthly ₹2,000 to women who head households, out of ₹52,526 crore for all five. Gruha Jyothi, the free power, took ₹9,158 crore. Anna Bhagya, the grain, took ₹7,858 crore. Shakti, the free bus travel, took ₹5,615 crore. Yuva Nidhi, for unemployed graduates, took ₹287 crore⁶. So the question of who gains is mostly a question about Gruha Lakshmi, and the article on the guarantees sets out who was on its lists and who was not. The guarantees are not limited to the poor. Gruha Lakshmi leaves out families that pay income tax or GST and no others, and Shakti is open to every woman.
Figure 16 · Gruha Lakshmi took 56 paise of every rupee spent on the five guarantees in 2024-25

What to see: spending on each of the five guarantees in 2024-25. Gruha Lakshmi is ₹29,608 crore of ₹52,526 crore. Yuva Nidhi is ₹287 crore.
Source: CAG State Finances report 2024-25.
The two audits do not give the same figure for the first year. A press report of the earlier audit lists five scheme lines for 2023-24 that add up to ₹36,497.96 crore, which is the figure used in the article on the guarantees. The later audit gives ₹34,859 crore for the same year, and that is the figure I use here. I could not reconcile the two. The later audit marks its 2023-24 figures as of August 2024, which may explain part of the gap.
The auditor says three things about what they did to the accounts, in its own words. "The introduction of five guarantee schemes in 2023-24 shifted the State from a Revenue Surplus to Revenue Deficit." The state "was forced to apply a squeeze on some of its ongoing schemes such as on Nutrition". And, "Though the revenue growth is stable, it is insufficient to absorb the recurring costs of the guarantee schemes"⁶. The report names nutrition, assistance to local bodies and assistance to gram panchayats among the heads squeezed⁷. These are the Comptroller and Auditor General's conclusions for 2023-24 and 2024-25. I report them as the auditor's and add none of my own. The audit says that at a closing meeting in January 2026 the state government accepted the facts, and does not say which. I found no written reply on the guarantees. After the earlier audit, in August 2025, H.M. Revanna, who chairs the authority that oversees the guarantees, rejected its conclusion and said the schemes had raised incomes and GST collections. The report of his statement gives no figures for that claim⁴⁹. In September 2026 a minister, H.C. Balakrishna, was reported as telling protesters that without the guarantees the problem would not have been so severe, and as saying later that he did not mean the schemes would end⁴⁸.
What does the auditor not say? It does not say the guarantees caused the unpaid contractor bills. It does not say they caused the 2026 note. And it records that the state's revenue grew by 10.63% in 2024-25, which it calls stable⁷.
Capital spending is the test of whether building was cut. By the auditor's table it was ₹45,406 crore in 2020-21, ₹47,874 crore in 2021-22 and ₹57,349 crore in 2022-23, the three BJP years in the table. It fell to ₹52,120 crore in 2023-24, the first Congress year, and rose to ₹57,906 crore in 2024-25⁶. The fall of ₹5,229 crore in 2023-24 is the figure the audit of that year described as a "compression in gross capital formation" that "may prove to be detrimental to future growth prospects"⁸.
It has recovered in rupees and not as a share of the economy. Capital spending was 2.77% of GSDP in 2020-21, 2.40% in 2021-22, 2.47% in 2022-23, 2.04% in 2023-24 and 2.01% in 2024-25⁶. The BJP years show a fall from the first to the second year as well. The lowest two years in the series are the two most recent audited ones.
Building was cut again in 2025-26, against the budget. The 2025-26 budget set capital outlay at ₹68,172 crore. The revised estimate is ₹62,834 crore, 8% lower⁵. In the same year the state's own tax revenue was revised down by ₹15,000 crore, from ₹2,08,100 crore to ₹1,93,100 crore, and the revenue deficit came in 32% above budget⁵. My reading is that when revenue fell short, building was cut and running costs were not. PRS shows the numbers and does not state the cause. The government attributes about ₹9,000 crore to ₹10,000 crore of the shortfall to the Union government's change in GST rates in 2025, which is the government's own estimate²⁵ ²⁶.
The BJP government did not cut building below its budgets in the years I could check. In 2022-23 the revised estimate for capital outlay was 21% above the budget, and the actual was ₹57,349 crore⁶ ¹⁰. That is to its credit on this measure. Part Four set out the other side: a part of that building was tendered without the money to pay for it.
For 2026-27 the plan is capital outlay of ₹71,924 crore, 14% above the 2025-26 revised figure⁵. The finance department's note, written six months into the year, is in effect a warning that this figure is already under strain.
Which districts are waiting the record does not say, and that is a finding in itself. The audit counts 4,328 incomplete projects and, in irrigation alone, 1,903 incomplete works⁶. The road scheme promised 15,000 km of rural roads³. I found no district-wise list of which roads are unbuilt or which works are stopped for want of payment. Villages without an all-weather road are the third group left out. Their promise has a number of kilometres and no date.
Figure 17 · Capital spending fell from 2.77% of GSDP in 2020-21 to 2.01% in 2024-25

What to see: capital spending in ₹ crore as bars, with its share of GSDP written above each bar, for 2020-21 to 2024-25. In rupees it recovers after the fall of 2023-24. As a share of the economy the two latest years are the lowest.
Source: CAG State Finances report 2024-25.
Part Six — Delhi cut the share, and the rupees still rose
A real part of it does, the state's largest figure for it is the state's own claim, and the cut has been half restored from this year.
The complaint turns on one number. The 14th Finance Commission gave Karnataka 4.713% of the pool of central taxes shared with states. The 15th Finance Commission, for 2021-22 to 2025-26, cut it to 3.647%. The 16th Finance Commission, for 2026-27 to 2030-31, raised it to 4.131%⁵ ²³ ²⁴. I checked these three figures against PRS and two news reports, and they agree. The states' combined share of the pool stayed at 41%.
The cut was not the Union government's own act. The Finance Commission is a constitutional body, and its formula applies to every state. The Union government accepted both awards. So the cut was not a decision aimed at one state or one party. It fell on the BJP state government for the first two years of the award and on the Congress government for the last three.
On the cost, the state says about ₹65,000 crore over the 15th commission's period, and adds that special grants of ₹5,495 crore and state-specific grants of ₹6,000 crore recommended by that commission were not released²⁵. These are the state government's figures from its budget speech. I did not find an independent calculation that confirms the ₹65,000 crore. The direction is supported by the shares themselves: 3.647 is about 23% lower than 4.713.
In rupees the money has gone up every year. The state received ₹34,596 crore as its share of central taxes in 2022-23, ₹46,933 crore in 2024-25, and expects ₹63,050 crore in 2026-27 under the new share⁵ ⁹ ²³. So the fair statement is that the state got less than it would have under the old formula, not less than before.
Figure 18 · Karnataka's share of central taxes was cut and then half restored, while the rupees rose each year

What to see: the share under three Finance Commissions: 4.713%, then 3.647%, then 4.131%. Beside it, the money received: ₹34,596 crore in 2022-23, ₹46,933 crore in 2024-25 and ₹63,050 crore expected in 2026-27.
Source: PRS Legislative Research budget analyses, and reports of the 16th Finance Commission's award.
Economists call this pull between Delhi and the state vertical fiscal imbalance. The Union collects most of the taxes and the states do most of the spending, so every state depends on a formula it does not write. The Finance Commission exists to correct that every five years. A state's complaint about its share is a normal part of the system, and so is the reply that the formula is the same for all.
The higher share from 2026-27 does not end the squeeze. The 2026-27 budget already counts the ₹63,050 crore, and it still shows a revenue deficit of ₹22,957 crore and a fiscal deficit of 2.95%⁵. The note of 17 September was written after the higher share took effect.
GST is the other half of the complaint. GST compensation from the Union ended in June 2022, under the BJP state government. In 2025 the Union government and the GST Council reduced the rate slabs. Siddaramaiah said the state would lose "around Rs 9,000 crore on this count alone", and the 2026-27 budget speech estimated a shortfall of ₹10,000 crore for 2025-26²⁵ ²⁶. PRS shows state GST for 2025-26 revised down from ₹92,132 crore to ₹80,108 crore⁵. The fall is in the record. How much of it is due to the rate change is the state's estimate.
So is the defence in Part Two right? In its facts, yes. In its conclusion, only partly. This is my reading. The tax share was cut, the bills were partly inherited, and the limits are met. But a government that knew its share had been cut still added about ₹50,000 crore a year of new recurring cost in 2023, and a government that inherited unpaid bills has let them grow. The same reading applies backwards. A government that had just lost its GST compensation in 2022 still tendered thousands of crores of works in its last six months. Each government names the constraint it was handed and is silent on the commitment it added.
Why two rival governments should make the same choice is a question political economy has names for. A voter sees a transfer in her account and a foundation stone on her road. She does not see a bill lying unpaid in a department's file, or the interest due in 2035. So a government gains by placing its costs where they are least seen. Economists call this fiscal illusion. A government that may lose the next election also has little reason to leave room for its successor. And works bunch before polls. By the successor's account, 1,247 works were taken up in the BJP government's last six months. The present government is reported to be looking for ₹50,000 crore for works before the election of 2028⁴². Psychologists call the same pull present bias: a gain today is weighed above a larger cost later. I use these terms as lenses. I have not tested them on Karnataka's figures, and they describe a habit without excusing it.
Part Seven — Seven ways out, and eight fixes so that the books tell the whole truth
Eight changes, in my view. Each exists somewhere in Indian law or practice, and none is proven to work everywhere. Before the fixes, the choices.
There are at least seven ways out of the squeeze, and none is closed. The table sets each beside what the record says of it and the person who would bear it. The last column is my reading.
Way out | What the record says | Who would bear it |
Raise more revenue | The state's own tax revenue for 2025-26 was revised down by ₹15,000 crore | Taxpayers and buyers |
Toll, lease or sell assets | A reported plan to raise about ₹30,000 crore in two years this way. It had not gone to the cabinet when reported | Road users, and later governments that lose the income |
Narrow the guarantees | I found no proposal. They cost about ₹51,000 crore a year | Households taken off the lists, most of them headed by women |
Phase the new works | The November road package is reported as spread over two years | Villages and towns that wait longer |
Pay the old bills over several years | About ₹12,000 crore a year over three years, or ₹7,200 crore over five | Contractors and their labourers, who go on waiting |
Borrow more | A margin of about ₹1,700 crore under the 3% line | Those who repay later |
Cut other spending | The auditor records a squeeze on nutrition and on grants to local bodies | Children and panchayats |
Sources: PRS Legislative Research⁵, the audit of 2024-25⁶, and reports of 30 September and 5 November 2026⁴² ⁴⁴. The ₹30,000 crore is the reported target of ₹50,000 crore less the ₹20,000 crore expected from the budget. The yearly sums for the bills are my division of ₹36,136 crore.
Figure 19 · Spread over five years, the pending bills would still need four times the budget's margin each year

What to see: ₹36,136 crore paid in one year, in three and in five, as a sum for each year. The line marks the margin of about ₹1,700 crore left under the 3% deficit limit in the 2026-27 budget. All four numbers are my arithmetic. The comparison assumes that each year's payment is met by new borrowing. If it is met by a cut or by new revenue, the margin is not the test.
Source: finance department note of 17 September 2026 as reported, and PRS Legislative Research, Karnataka Budget Analysis 2026-27.
So the fair statement is not that Karnataka has no way out. It is that every way out moves the wait to someone, and that no document I read says who was chosen. The table names who would bear each way out. It does not price them. I found no published estimate of what tolls or leases would bring in after costs, of the income given up, or of what a narrower guarantee would save.
The fixes begin with the accounts, because every dispute in this article is a dispute about a number that nobody has published. How much is owed to contractors, and from which year. Which works are stopped, and where. What the guarantees were expected to cost before the vote. The Arthaśāstra opens its chapter on the misuse of public money with a rule of two sentences³⁷:
"All undertakings depend upon finance. Hence foremost attention shall be paid to the treasury." Arthaśāstra, Book II, Chapter 8, in R. Shamasastry's translation
The chapter that follows is about officials who cause loss to the treasury. I use the line for a narrower point. A government that does not publish what its treasury owes cannot show what it can promise. The reading is mine.
Nobody checks a promise before the vote today. In January 2017 the committee that reviewed the Union's fiscal law, chaired by N.K. Singh, proposed an independent Fiscal Council to make forecasts and advise on fiscal targets³⁹. On 4 October 2022 the Election Commission wrote to parties proposing that manifestos state how each promise would be financed. It said: "The trust of voters should be sought only on those promises which are possible to be fulfilled." Opposition parties objected that this was not the Commission's business³⁸. I could not confirm whether the proposal was adopted. A state could act without waiting. It could ask its own fiscal council, or the Finance Commission it already appoints, to publish the cost of any scheme above a set size before the Cabinet approves it.
Problem the record shows | Fix (my proposal) | Who can act | Where it has been done | Cost or way it can fail |
₹36,136 crore of bills that no limit counts | A register of pending bills, by department, published each month and reported beside the deficit | Finance department, by order | The finance department already holds the figure, as its note shows | A register can be kept low by not accepting bills, unless it records the date each bill is submitted, checked, disputed, accepted and paid |
Contractors paid months or years late | A duty to pay within a fixed number of days, with interest after that | Legislature, by an Act | MSMED Act, 2006: 45 days, then compound interest at three times the bank rate | A department can delay accepting the work to stop the clock |
No cash against an accepted bill | Put departments on an invoice-discounting platform | Finance department with the banks | TReDS, compulsory for central public sector enterprises since 2018 | The financier's discount is a cost someone must bear |
Works approved far beyond the budget | No tender without a certificate that money is provided for each year of the work | Finance department, by rule | The note of 17 September 2026 names the fault: projects added with no money identified beyond the year | Certificates become a formality in an election year |
Money released before the legislature votes it | Report each such release to the House within a fixed number of days | Legislature, through its accounts committee | The CAG reports the total each year, after the event | Reporting is not prevention |
Promises made without a costing | An independent fiscal council that costs large schemes and manifestos | Legislature for the state. Election Commission for manifestos | Proposed for the Union in 2017. The Election Commission proposed disclosure in 2022 | Parties objected. A council appointed by the government it watches may not be independent |
Running costs met by borrowing | A dated path back to revenue balance, reported each quarter | Cabinet, in the medium-term plan | The state's medium-term plan names 2029-30 | A date four years away binds no one in office today |
No list of stalled works by district | Publish works, payments and stoppages by district | Each works department | No example found | The cost of keeping it current |
Sources: as cited in this article¹ ² ⁶ ¹² ³³ ³⁶ ³⁸ ³⁹. The column on who can act is my reading.
Which comes first? The register. It needs no new law and no new money, and every other fix depends on knowing what is owed. The payment clock comes next, and it should start on the day a bill is submitted, so that a department cannot stop it by not accepting the work. The costing of promises comes third, because it is the only fix that acts before the cost is taken on.
The last table sets out what a student of each subject can take from this record.
Lens | The question it asks | What the record shows here |
Development economics | Is the state borrowing to build or to run? | A revenue deficit in four years running. Capital spending at 2.01% of GSDP in 2024-25 |
Public finance | Is the debt on a safe path? | Inside 25%, with growth above the interest rate, and "too early" to call sustainable, in the auditor's words |
Accounting | Does the book show what is owed? | Cash accounting leaves ₹36,136 crore out of every limit |
Business | What does a buyer who pays late do to its suppliers? | Bills pending since 2021-22 by the contractors' account. No interest is reported paid |
Law | Which limits bind, and are they met? | Two of three are met. The third has not been met since 2023-24 |
Philosophy | What does one generation owe the next? | Interest is projected to rise to 1.85% of GSDP by 2029-30 |
Federalism | Who decides the state's income? | The tax share was cut to 3.647% and restored to 4.131% |
Political economy | Why do rival governments make the same choice? | Both placed costs where voters see them least: unpaid bills, unbudgeted works and later interest |
Sociology | Who waits longest? | Lenders and staff are paid on the day. Contractors wait for years. Labourers have no direct claim |
Psychology | Why is a later cost weighed so lightly? | Present bias. A lens I have not tested here |
Ending — The note is still on the file
The note of 17 September 2026 has not been withdrawn, answered in public or published. It said the state should wait until it could see the money. Since then the cabinet is reported to have approved the ₹10,000 crore road scheme and, on 5 November, a further ₹20,000 crore for roads and bridges. The contractors' November deadline is running. The budget for 2027-28 is four months away.
So, can Karnataka afford what it promised? It can afford the five guarantees, or it can afford to pay its builders on time and keep building at the old pace, or it can keep its revenue account in balance as its own law requires. On the budget as it stands, with no new revenue and no cut elsewhere, it cannot do all three. The ways out in Part Seven are real, and each one sends a different person to the back of the queue. For three years it has chosen the first and let the other two give way. The BJP government before it made a different version of the same choice: it kept the deficit low and left bills and half-funded works behind.
The pot is full to the brim. The road for the village, the bill of the contractor, the wage of his labourer, the monthly transfer to the woman who heads a household and the interest owed to the lender all need to go into it. The hardest question is one that no note, budget or audit I read answers. When the next rupee falls short, who is told to wait, and where is that decision written down so that the people waiting can read it?
More from Satyameva Jayate · Karnataka: Two Months Missing — Did Karnataka's Five Guarantees Reach the People They Named?
Words to keep
Karnataka is just inside two of its three legal limits and outside the third.
A bill counts as spending when it is paid, not when the work is done.
Interest now costs the state more than the five guarantees.
In rupees, the debt grew by almost the same amount in the last two BJP years as in the first two Congress years.
Each government names the constraint it was handed and is silent on the commitment it added.
The state got less than it would have under the old formula, not less than before.
The queue for the state's money follows power.
Every way out moves the wait to someone.
Not one of the reports I read on the unpaid bills mentions a labourer.
When the next rupee falls short, who is told to wait, and where is that decision written down?
Sources
"Finance department flags fiscal squeeze as Karnataka weighs new projects", The Week, 22 September 2026. https://www.theweek.in/news/biz-tech/2026/09/22/finance-department-flags-fiscal-squeeze-as-karnataka-weighs-new-projects.html
"Karnataka finance dept cautions against new major projects amid fiscal constraints", PTI in ThePrint, 22 September 2026. https://theprint.in/india/karnataka-finance-dept-cautions-against-new-major-projects-amid-fiscal-constraints/3050205/
"Major infrastructure, tourism and fisheries projects get cabinet nod", Deccan Chronicle, 18 September 2026. https://www.deccanchronicle.com/amp/southern-states/karnataka/major-infrastructure-tourism-and-fisheries-projects-get-cabinet-nod-1988651
"Karnataka's ₹10,000 cr rural road push", The Logical Indian, 20 September 2026. https://thelogicalindian.com/karnatakas-%E2%82%B910000-cr-rural-road-push-127747/
"Karnataka Budget Analysis 2026-27", PRS Legislative Research, March 2026. https://prsindia.org/budgets/states/karnataka-budget-analysis-2026-27
"Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on State Finances for the year 2024-25, Government of Karnataka (Report No. 2 of 2026)", CAG, tabled 26 March 2026. https://cag.gov.in/ag2/karnataka/en/audit-report/details/124514
"Karnataka forced to cut down its funds for nutrition, local bodies due to increase in subsidies: CAG", PTI in ThePrint, 26 March 2026. https://theprint.in/india/ktaka-forced-to-cut-down-its-funds-fur-nutrition-local-bodies-due-to-increasing-in-subsidies-cag/2889749
"'Detrimental to growth': CAG on guarantee schemes impacting Karnataka finances", Deccan Herald, 19 August 2025. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/story/india/karnataka/detrimental-to-growth-cag-on-guarantee-schemes-impacting-karnataka-finances-3687881
"Karnataka Budget Analysis 2024-25", PRS Legislative Research, 2024. https://prsindia.org/budgets/states/karnataka-budget-analysis-2024-25
"Karnataka Budget Analysis 2023-24", PRS Legislative Research, July 2023. https://prsindia.org/budgets/states/karnataka-budget-analysis-2023-24
"Karnataka Budget Analysis 2022-23", PRS Legislative Research, 2022. https://prsindia.org/budgets/states/karnataka-budget-analysis-2022-23
"Rich state, borrowed money: Karnataka's growth story has a debt problem that is only getting worse", ThePrint, 14 March 2026. https://theprint.in/economy/rich-state-borrowed-money-karnatakas-growth-story-has-a-debt-problem-that-is-only-getting-worse/2878248
"Pending contractor bills left behind by BJP, says Karnataka CM Siddaramaiah", IANS in Lokmat Times, 30 January 2026. https://www.lokmattimes.com/national/pending-contractor-bills-left-behind-by-bjp-says-karnataka-cm-siddaramiah-bjp-alleges-corruption/amp
"Karnataka: Siddaramaiah blames BJP for Rs 38,000 cr contractor dues", Asianet Newsable, 30 January 2026. https://newsable.asianetnews.com/india/karnataka-siddaramaiah-blames-bjp-for-rs-38000-cr-contractor-dues-articleshow-uc7u9wn
"KSCA threatens agitation over Rs 38,000 cr dues, alleges commission is higher now", PTI in ThePrint, 30 September 2026. https://theprint.in/india/ksca-threatens-agitation-over-rs-38000-cr-dues-alleges-commission-is-higher-now/3058091/
"Amid fund crunch, Karnataka gets contractors' warning: clear Rs 38k cr dues or we expose bribe-seekers", ThePrint, report on events of 30 September 2026. https://theprint.in/politics/amid-fund-crunch-karnataka-gets-contractors-warning-clear-rs-38k-cr-dues-or-we-expose-bribe-seekers/3058750/
"Karnataka contractors seek release of Rs 38,000 crore pending bills", IANS in Telangana Today, 29 September 2026. https://telanganatoday.com/karnataka-contractors-seek-release-of-rs-38000-crore-pending-bills
"D.K. Shivakumar tells Karnataka contractors govt will pay as per budget", IANS in Telangana Today, 18 February 2026. https://telanganatoday.com/d-k-shivakumar-tells-karnataka-contractors-govt-will-pay-as-per-budget
"Clear pending bills by August 31: Karnataka contractors' body urges government", The News Minute, 11 August 2023. https://thenewsminute.com/article/clear-pending-bills-august-31-karnataka-contractors-body-urges-government-180937
"Karnataka contractors meet Siddaramaiah, set 30-day deadline to clear pending bills", South First, 15 October 2023. https://thesouthfirst.com/karnataka/karnataka-contractors-meet-siddaramaiah-set-30-day-deadline-to-clear-pending-bills
"Amid guarantee push, Karnataka government under pressure to keep projects afloat", Deccan Herald, 12 August 2023. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/story/india%2Fkarnataka%2Famid-guarantee-push-karnataka-government-under-pressure-to-keep-projects-afloat-2645004
"Karnataka Budget: Rs 1 lakh crore needed to implement approved irrigation projects", Deccan Herald, July 2023. https://www.deccanherald.com/india/karnataka/karnataka-budget-rs-1-lakh-crore-needed-to-implement-approved-irrigation-projects-1235052.html
"NDA-ruled Andhra Pradesh gains most among southern states under new tax devolution formula", South First, 1 February 2026. https://thesouthfirst.com/andhrapradesh/nda-ruled-andhra-pradesh-gains-most-among-southern-states-under-new-tax-devolution-formula
"Is 16th Finance Commission offering southern states a fair deal?", Deccan Herald (opinion), 2026. https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/is-16th-finance-commission-offering-southern-states-a-fair-deal-3909640
"Karnataka: CM unveils Rs 4.48 lakh cr budget, blames Union govt for financial strain", The News Minute, 6 March 2026. https://www.thenewsminute.com/karnataka/karnataka-cm-unveils-rs-448-lakh-cr-budget-blames-union-govt-for-financial-strain
"Karnataka govt faces Rs 15,000 crore revenue shortfall this fiscal, likely to cut budget size", ETV Bharat, 16 February 2026. https://www.etvbharat.com/en/state/karnataka-govt-faces-rs-15000-crore-revenue-shortfall-this-fiscal-likely-to-cut-budget-size-enn26021602789
"Karnataka Cabinet approves Rs 20,000 crore for road infrastructure development across state", ANI in Devdiscourse, 5 November 2026. https://www.devdiscourse.com/article/headlines/4002260-karnataka-cabinet-approves-rs-20000-crore-for-road-infrastructure-development-across-state
"Pending bill payments: Don't drive contractors to suicide, Karnataka HC tells govt", PTI in South First, 30 November 2023. https://thesouthfirst.com/pti/pending-bill-payments-dont-drive-contractors-to-suicide-karnataka-hc-tells-govt/
"Karnataka BJP stages protest after finance dept flags limited fiscal space", PTI in Outlook Business, 23 September 2026. https://www.outlookbusiness.com/news/karnataka-bjp-stages-protest-after-finance-dept-flags-limited-fiscal-space
"Haveri contractors seek mercy killing over unpaid dues by Karnataka govt", Deccan Herald, 14 April 2025. https://www.deccanherald.com/amp/story/india%2Fkarnataka%2Fhaveri-contractors-seek-mercy-killing-over-unpaid-dues-by-karnataka-govt-3492352
"K'taka Contractors' delegation meets Shivakumar, seeks release of Rs 38,000 crore pending dues", Social News XYZ, 2 November 2026. https://www.socialnews.xyz/2026/11/02/ktaka-contractors-delegation-meets-shivakumar-seeks-release-of-rs-38000-crore-pending-dues/
"Karnataka contractors seek ₹38,000 crore from government", Indian Opinion, 3 November 2026, updated 5 November 2026. https://indianopinion.org/karnataka-contractors-seek-rs38-000-crore-from-government/
"The Stringency Of Interest Provisions Under MSMED Act: Implementation And Judicial Interpretation", LiveLaw, on sections 15 and 16 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006. https://www.livelaw.in/amp/law-firms/law-firm-articles-/the-stringency-of-interest-provisions-under-msmed-act-implementation-and-judicial-interpretation-310929
Tirukkuṟaḷ 478, in chapter 48, English translation published by Himalayan Academy. https://gurudeva.org/media/books/tirukural/web/pg_216.html
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 6 September 1789. Founders Online, United States National Archives. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0248
"Mandatory Registration for Corporates on Trade Receivables E-Discounting System (TReDS) Platform", Legal 500, on notification S.O. 5621(E) of 2 November 2018. https://www.legal500.com/intelligence/india/corporate-commercial-law/mandatory-registration-for-corporates-on-trade-receivables-e-discounting-system-treds-platform
Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, Book II, Chapter 8, translated by R. Shamasastry. Text hosted by Columbia University. https://franpritchett.com/00litlinks/kautilya/book02.htm
"Political parties should give details of how they plan to finance poll promises, proposes EC", Scroll, 4 October 2022. https://scroll.in/latest/1034284/scroll_in
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"Assembly Election Karnataka, Manifesto 2023: Sarva Janangada Shanthiya Thota", Karnataka Pradesh Congress Committee, 2023. 25-page edition. Pages 6 and 25 are cited.
Bharatiya Janata Party, Karnataka Assembly election manifesto 2023 (English). 48 pages. Printed page 12 is cited.
"Cash-strapped Karnataka looks to mobilise Rs 50k cr in next 2 yrs for development works before 2028 polls", ThePrint, 30 September 2026. https://theprint.in/india/cash-strapped-karnataka-looks-to-mobilise-rs-50k-cr-in-next-2-yrs-for-development-works-before-2028-polls/3057888/
"Karnataka releases Rs 2,400 crore amid Rs 38,000 crore dues", News Karnataka, 3 October 2026. https://newskarnataka.com/bengaluru/karnataka-releases-rs-2400-crore-amid-rs-38000-crore-dues/03102026/
"Cabinet approves road infrastructure projects worth Rs 20,000 cr in K'taka", PTI in ThePrint, 5 November 2026. https://theprint.in/india/cabinet-approves-road-infrastructure-projects-worth-rs-20000-cr-in-ktaka/3091790/
"State of State Finances: 2025-26", PRS Legislative Research, October 2025. https://prsindia.org/files/budget/SOSF_2025.pdf
"Pay hike for 7 lakh government staff as Karnataka decides to implement 7th Pay Commission recommendations", South First, 15 July 2024. https://thesouthfirst.com/karnataka/pay-hike-for-7-lakh-government-staff-as-karnataka-decides-to-implement-7th-pay-commission-recommendations
"Karnataka BJP demands white paper on state finances", Organiser, 23 September 2026. https://organiser.org/2026/09/23/382255/bharat/karnataka-congress-govt-finances-under-scanner-bjp-demands-white-paper-and-cm-shivakumars-resignation/
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How I wrote this
What I read in the original. The Comptroller and Auditor General's report on Karnataka's State Finances for 2024-25 (Report No. 2 of 2026, tabled on 26 March 2026). From it I took the five-year series for liabilities, fiscal deficit, capital spending, committed spending, interest, borrowings, releases by executive order, incomplete works and the construction workers' cess, and its paragraphs on fiscal targets, debt sustainability, loan guarantees, off-budget borrowings and undischarged liabilities. Table and paragraph numbers should be checked against the printed report before publication. The PRS Legislative Research analyses of the Karnataka budgets for 2022-23, 2023-24, 2024-25 and 2026-27, which summarise the budget papers, and its comparison of state budgets of October 2025. I have not read the budget papers themselves. The 2023 manifestos of the Congress and the BJP. Jefferson's letter of 6 September 1789, the opening of Arthaśāstra Book II, Chapter 8 in Shamasastry's translation, and the PRS summary of the FRBM Review Committee's report.
What rests on press reports. The finance department's note of 17 September 2026, which I know only through The Week and PTI. The cabinet decisions of 18 September and 5 November 2026. The plan to raise ₹50,000 crore and the release of ₹2,400 crore, each from one report that cites officials it does not name. The pay commission decision of July 2024, the BJP's demands of 23 September 2026, and the statements of H.M. Revanna and H.C. Balakrishna. Article 293 is taken from a summary by a legal research body. The audit of 2023-24, quoted from the Deccan Herald's report, with its ₹5,229 crore figure confirmed by subtraction in the later audit's table. The July 2023 budget speech, quoted from the Deccan Herald. All statements by the contractors' association, ministers and party leaders, which I treat as claims. Sections 15 and 16 of the MSMED Act are taken from a legal commentary, the TReDS notification from a law firm's note, and the Election Commission's proposal of 2022 from a news report.
What I have not seen or could not confirm. The note itself. The two cabinet orders. Whether the finance department's observations went before the cabinet. The CAG report for 2023-24. Any official figure for all pending bills across the government. What the ₹36,136 crore consists of: accepted or disputed bills, capital or revenue. Where Karnataka stands against the Union's borrowing ceiling for 2026-27. The official text of the budget speech of 6 March 2026, which I quote as reported. The text of the Karnataka Fiscal Responsibility Act. Whether the sums announced for new works overlap. Any estimate of what each way out would raise or save. A current count of the population for the debt per person. Any audited split of the dues between the two governments. Any count of labourers employed by unpaid contractors or of wages owed to them. Any district-wise list of stalled works. An audited figure for liabilities in 2019-20 on the same basis as later years. Whether the MSMED Act's interest rule or TReDS applies to a state department's works contracts. Whether the Election Commission's proposal was adopted. Whether the 25-page Congress document is the party's full manifesto. I have not looked for Assembly replies on pending bills, so their absence here means I did not look, not that none exist.
Readings that are mine. The image of the full pot. The arithmetic of the room left under the deficit and debt limits. The estimate that paying the pending bills would take the deficit to about 4%. The share of this year's borrowing that meets running costs. The comparison of debt added in two two-year periods. The inference about which bills remain unpaid. The reading that building was cut when revenue fell short in 2025-26. The logic of late payment and the order of the state's creditors in Part Four. The lenses of fiscal illusion and present bias in Part Six. The last column of the table of ways out, and the division of the pending bills over three and five years. The debt per person. The sum of the three announcements for new works. The total of the three audit figures for dues not paid. The use of Jefferson, the Tirukkuṟaḷ and the Arthaśāstra. The closing judgement that the state cannot do all three things at once. Every fix in Part Seven is my proposal.
How the same test was applied to others. I used one source, the auditor's five-year table, for both governments on debt, deficit, capital spending and releases by executive order. On those measures the BJP's last full year, 2022-23, was the best in the series, and I say so. I applied the unpaid-bills test to that year as well and found the same gap between the deficit and the dues. On unbudgeted works I relied on the successor government's budget speech and on finance department sources quoted in the press, and I have said that the first is an interested party. For the Union government I recorded the cut in the tax share, its partial restoration, and the fact that the cut fell on a BJP state government first.
What I did not do. I did not interview contractors, labourers or officials, and I did not put questions to the finance department on the note, the make-up of the bills, the borrowing ceiling or the overlap between the announcements. Both should be done before the next quarterly update of this article.

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